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Toxic torts: arsenic poisoning in Bangladesh and the legal geographies of responsibility Introduction
In 2002, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognized access to water as an independent human right: "the right to water clearly falls within the category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate standard of living, particularly since it is one of the most fundamental conditions for survival" (WHO 2003) .
Among the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Bangladesh has taken this right most seriously. Approximately 97 per cent of its rural people now have access to bacteriologically clean water (MLG 2003) , as a result of the installation of about 12 million tubewells.
1 These supply about 80 per cent of national drinking water demand (Ahmed 2002) . 2 We can attribute at least part of the significant drop in infant mortality, from 151 to 83 per thousand 1960-96, and in under-five mortality from 247 to 112 per thousand, to this ready availability of clean water (WHO 2000) . 3 Until the middle of the 1990s this was the only element of national water policy that had widespread support and that did not present major technical difficulties (Black 1990) . The other strands, including the Flood Action Plan, sanitation, water pollution, irrigation, drainage, cyclone shelters, and fisheries, were all more or less problematic and their policies widely criticized (Wood 1999) . 4 The expansion of tubewells came with the financial help of UNICEF after the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. At first sight, they seem to be the perfect development tool -a cheap and effective technology that has been received enthusiastically by the users. Having a tubewell was a matter of convenience but also a status symbol and, as a result, people have been willing to invest their own money in private installations (Black 1990) . There are limitless supplies of the raw material underground, a Promethean bounty waiting to be released. However, the result of this reliance upon tubewells -a cruel irony this -has been an environmental health disaster of unprecedented proportions, many times worse than Chernobyl and Bhopal combined (Smith et al. 2000) . About a third of tubewells produce seriously contaminated water, with a broad swathe across the centre and south of the country being particularly at risk (Atkins et al. 2006a) . 5 One estimate is that millions of people will die or suffer from the very serious consequences of consuming the arsenic that occurs naturally in aquifers in the Holocene sediments of the Bengal delta (Yu et al. 2003) . 6 Arsenic is a colourless, odourless and tasteless poison and, to give an idea of its miniscule presence, it occurs at the equivalent of about one-third of a teaspoon-full dissolved in the water of an Olympic-sized swimming pool (Meharg 2004) .
One exemplary case of is that of Binod Sutradhar, a carpenter from Ramrail in Brahmanbaria district. He suffers from painful keratoses, hard lumps or papules, on his hands and feet, which he claims are the result of consuming water contaminated with minute traces of arsenic. London to the Court of Appeal and in 2006 it will go to the House of Lords. 8 The legal argument to date has only been about whether a trial should take place and no detailed evidence has yet been heard.
Mr Sutradhar is alleging a "tort", legally defined as a damage caused by someone else"s action or inaction. The point of law at stake is the controversial notion of "proximity": the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in terms of geography and "duty of care". The NERC/BGS is alleged to be liable because of its responsibility, through its water monitoring activities, to the water consumers who would have benefited from a fuller analysis of the samples they collected. This is a developing area of environmental law that has major implications for scientific consultancy and the application of expert knowledge in the aid industry, and it raises the issue of whether western academics and researchers have a legal responsibility to their clients in the LDCs.
If we were writing lurid tabloid headlines, we might call it the "Revenge of the Third World": the frankly extraordinary prospect of ordinary people, who have suffered the negative environmental consequences of failed development projects, claiming damages in courts around the world.
A more measured legal appraisal is that proximity, in its present definition at least, will be difficult to prove in the case of the mass arsenic poisoning in Bangladesh and that the NERC is very unlikely to be found liable for any failure in their duty of care (Pugh and Criddle 2004) . But the importance of Sutradhar v NERC may be more symbolic than having a specific outcome for the Bangladeshi litigants. If the case ever comes to trial it could act as a trojan horse in terms of the legal arguments that may be used in future, stronger cases of negligence in environmental policy or practice. The potential significance, in terms of the emergence of a new breed of transboundary environmental actions with a global face, has been revealed recently in the journal Nature, where it has been speculated by Allen and Lord (2004) that evidence linking global warming to the release of greenhouse gases is now so strong that at some point it may be possible to mount a legal argument apportioning blame for deleterious consequences. The example they give is the enhanced death rates in parts of western Europe due to increases in temperatures of up to 10° C higher than normal in the summer of 2003.
The present paper addresses the principal irony that well-intentioned actions to provide sustainable solutions to environmental problems occasionally go wrong with disastrous consequences. In this case the actions were international, and Sutradhar v NERC seeks, in the globalized context of the aid industry, to bring responsibility in line with supposed generosity. 9 We start with a consideration of the tortious spaces of the arsenic crisis in Bangladesh. This is followed by a consideration of fault and liability through a discussion of the case that has been brought in the British courts. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the concept of proximity.
What space for environmental justice?
Nick Blomley and David Delaney have pioneered legal geographies and enhanced our understanding of how courts construct and interpret place and space (Blomley 1994 , Delaney et al. 2001 . But, as Delaney (2001, 487-88) Mason (2001, 422) , is gradually "accumulating legal authority".
The globalization of notions of justice is a relatively recent phenomenon. Silbey (2001) comments that televised images of the American legal process, usually criminal court cases, have helped to spread such ideas, in the sense that they are products "sold" in a The spacings of torts are complex. Although the damage is time-space specific, the causal chain may be lengthy, in the case of Sutradhar v NERC allegedly stretching from
Bangladesh to the BGS headquarters in Nottinghamshire, with intermediation from the GoB, the British Government"s ODA, and the NERC. This particular strand is only one in a web of funding bodies, consultants and engineers who were involved with the vast tubewell programme in Bangladesh. "Proximity" in this case is best interpreted as interconnexions in a global network of information and influence, supporting Gregory"s (2004, 249) claim that "distance is never an absolute, fixed and frozen, and within the colonial present, like the colonial past, the power to transform distance…is typically arrogated by metropolitan cultures".
What then of the intersecting skeins of responsibility that constitute the globalised system of aid and consultancy? They are so complex that Beck (1999, 55) has called the difficulty of attributing blame a "travesty of the hazard technocracy" because "if it is necessary to name one and only one actor, in the overwhelming majority of cases no actor can be named". But each transaction, whether economic or scientific, is potentially damaging and therefore carries with it a latent liability, and the law of torts may therefore provide an answer for Beck"s problem. If it ever breaks through into the mainstream of quotidian international relations, it will fundamentally change the relationship between patrons and clients from one of caveat emptor (consumer beware) to caveat venditor (provider beware). Few outside the realms of socio-legal scholarship have thought of the world as legally inscribed in this way but, in one sense, we are identifying a future action-oriented justice that might put a measure of power into the hands of the wronged. Torts also, because compensation is involved, allocate a price to damage and therefore create a market that values environmental harm. Some argue that torts are preferable to the regulatory regime of international institutions in that they address harm in place-based contexts because they function at the human scale of the individual and the community (Anderson 2002).
The body-environment nexus
Kroll-Smith and Westervelt (2004) cite American cases that illustrate the ready permeability of the boundary between bodies and nature. They discuss mainly pollution by dangerous manufactured chemicals, but we might add chemicals used in food manufacture, chemicals such as fluoride that have been deliberately introduced to the human environment with a view to some beneficial effect, and natural toxins that adversely affect human health (Thornton 2000) . Arsenic is an example of the last category. It is one of the commonest elements, being widely dispersed in low concentrations in the environment, and traces are therefore present in our normal diet.
It only becomes dangerous in food and water above critical concentrations, which for water was recently reconfirmed by the World Health Organization as ten parts per billion (WHO 2004) . A shocking aspect of the arsenic crisis in Bangladesh is that it affects somewhere between 28 and 57 million people, many of whom it is thought will develop internal cancers as a result of years of consuming contaminated tubewell water (BGS and DPHE 2001) . 14 This is "the largest mass poisoning of a population in history" (Smith et al. 2000 (Smith et al. , 1093 .
A problem with such superlatives of disaster is the degree to which expert advice about body-environment links is admissible in court (Browne et al. 1998 Third, a legal strategy is essential, in order to decide whom to sue and in which court.
Both of these have been difficult to decide in the case of arsenic. Should the GoB be Because proximity, or "neighbourhood" as it is sometimes called, is contingent upon the facts of each case, the courts have tended to rely incrementally upon the precedent of case law rather than any precise definition or foundational principle. Having said that, "foreseeability" of the damage is generally thought of as a necessary condition, in this case referring to the reasonable likelihood that the 1992 BGS report would be shown to the Bangladeshi authorities responsible for ensuring a safe water supply in the study region as a basis for action.
In the Court of Appeal, the three judges delivered technical judgements that had little factual or abstract moral content. Lord Justice Kennedy"s commentary was divided into what he called "the construction issue" and "the proximity issue". On the former, he remarked that the report was clearly not intended as a comprehensive and definitive statement of water standards and, on the latter, he concluded that the BGS had "no duty to provide the claimant or his fellow citizens with potable water. They had no power to do so, and they could not even warn him of any dangers". Lord Justice Wall agreed and said that these points were sufficient to strike out the appeal, but Lord Justice Clarke Lord Justice Wall said that at first he had agreed with Lord Justice Clarke but then had changed his mind on hearing the arguments of counsel. The basis for this was that the precedent cases were in his opinion not sufficiently favourable for a definition of proximity broad enough for Mr Sutradhar"s case.
As a result of this judgement, the legal position for the time being seems to be that consultants are not legally liable in development aid situations "because of the geography, chain of dealings, and supposedly the need to protect the future provision of development aid funds which may become restricted if legal claims arise in respect of services provided" (Michalowska 2004). Beck (1999) predicted exactly this kind of outcome due to the "risk society"s" "organized irresponsibility", where attribution of responsibility has become increasingly difficult in complex technological systems.
It might be thought that the legal action was therefore pointless and achieved nothing. It is true that the complainants have so far gone empty-handed but they and those sympathetic to their action will have noted the minority judgement by Lord Justice
Clarke and the opening out of the issues has certainly been of significance for a number of reasons. First, the very notions of a duty of care and of proximity are now higher on the agenda of environmental law than they were before and, in the very process of holding the NERC to account, Mr Sutradhar and Mrs Begum have been producing natures radically different from our previous understandings (Delaney 2001). These were subtly differentiated in the advocacy of the top silks Hon. Michael Beloff QC and Lord (Dan) Brennan QC, and also in the majority and minority judgements, and whether one favours the claimants or not, it seems likely that the arguments deployed on their behalf will appear again in future cases, with outcomes that will vary with different constructions of the balance between rights and responsibilities, with the varying institutional settings and, of course, with the diverse socio-natures on trial.
Second, however, whether one likes it or not, the epistemological singularities of the law have been imprinted upon environmental issues. Thus, Valverde (2003) and other sociologists of the legal process have revealed how court room knowledge is a curious hybrid of witness statements and facts gleaned from expert testimony, comprising that quasi-transcendental entity, "common knowledge". In the case of torts, the bar for scientific evidence tends to be set high because such an elevated value is placed upon the The definition of a neighbour and of his/her proximity is therefore crucial. Smith (1998, 18) sets out the Aristotelian origins of the notion that "extreme distance leads to indifference, while extreme closeness can lead to pity, or to such other emotions as envy and destructive rivalry: part of the everyday experience of face-to-face society".
Boltanski (1993, 16 ) discusses this in the light of the global reach of the media and problematizes spectatorship in order to understand the link between the politics of pity and the politics of action. He makes a similar point:
"The person who sees from afar is unaware of other people receiving the news, how near they are relative to the case, their readiness to act and whether or not they have pre-commitments. Each is thereby uncertain as to the existence of a ranked series of persons under an obligation to act to different degrees, as to their possible position in this series, and as to the failure to act of possible helpers higher up in the series for whom they would have to become substitutes".
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On the other hand, Singer (1979 , 2004 ), Corbridge (1993 ), Rawls (1999 ), Smith (2000 , Follesdal and Pogge (2005) , and Pogge (2006) and many others restate the principles of universal, non-localized obligations and human rights. Without such obligations, international relations, at both state and non-state levels, would diverge irreconcilably from egalitarian ideas of justice. They would also ignore the essential geographical observation that people"s misfortunes often relate to their location, which in turn is a function of the contingencies of historical geography (Smith 1998).
Rorty (1989) would have us believe that meaning is derived from hope. Because of our commitment, like him, to certain aspects of pragmatism, we agree but wish to add an emphasis on action and practice (Atkins et al. 2006b ). This may be the place-specific, integrative conduct stressed by Cutchin (1999, 268) as promoting "the situational, deliberative, active, moral components of health and health care", but it may also be action at a scale that crosses continents. Denying responsibility because of an absence of immediacy of spatial association becomes morally indefensible if we reject the simplistic idea of proximity as co-presence and see it instead in its full complexity as networked association. At present the aid industry is using state institutions as holding companies or clearing houses of responsibility, in a way that enables a deniability of proximity. If there are sufficient steps in between the end user and the service provider, it is unlikely at present that anyone can be held to account. What is required, therefore, is the further development and maturing of the concept of proximity. Judicial commentaries on Sutradhar v NERC retain traces of a pre-modern law of torts, where the idea of action at a
distance had yet to be assimilated, let alone any concept of global action. In order to guard against Habermas"s concerns about the possibility of judicial tyranny, that judges tend to act according to their own interests and of the system that they serve (Ingram   2002) , we need what Rorty (1980) calls a "cosmopolitan conversation of humankind" in order to establish the pragmatic parameters that will redefine proximity in the interests of global environmental justice.
Missing from the judgements of both the High Court and the Court of Appeal is any appreciation of the reality of "action at a distance" in the worlds of environmental consultancy and international aid, or, for that matter, of the global reach of transnational capitalism. Sutradhar v NERC is an opportunity to debate this issue, and a more nuanced notion of proximity that would, in our opinion, be bound to eventuate. From a geographical point of view, Mason (2001, 422) has argued that "the growth of international law attests to the unbundling of sovereign authority for environmental governance, allowing new interstices of accountability", and it could be argued that responsibility for the arsenic poisoning of millions of people in Bangladesh can be understood only in terms of theoretical contexts that are very different from the spaces of scientific and legal realism.
Torts, proximity and legal geographies
There have been various suggestions recently to provide a different vision of torts, toxic and otherwise. Berger (1997), for instance, argues that reliance upon expert scientific evidence to establish causal proof of harm has been an encumbrance to justice. Thus epidemiological evidence is treated with scepticism by judge and jury, and often with good reason because proof of causation is exceptionally difficult when cancers, for instance, can have several origins. In the case of arsenic there is no single signature symptom that is derived solely from that source, so establishing a link is difficult with a level of probability that would satisfy a statistician. In addition, she argues for a fundamental overhaul of torts because of "the present system"s indifference to creating adequate inducements, short of litigation, to goad [polluters] into gathering the data and funding the research that [is] essential to identifying and assessing potential risks" (Berger 1997 (Berger , 2131 . She proposes that knowledge is so uncertain that the law should shift from proof of causality, always a problem for poor litigants and therefore a key issue in the "environmental justice", towards a duty of care. This would require the corporation, government or institution to undertake research and provide information relating to risk. proximity is seen as fundamental to ethics and also to the common law, and, in as much as legal geographies are elaborations of the nuances of proximity, they are therefore a key to both. Lévinas wrote of proximity, not in the calculative terms of Lord Atkin, but as an 'event that takes place prior to our having any categories in which to confine it' (Manderson 2006, 178) . It is constitutive of subjectivity, in its passive mode at least, which is always built in relation to the 'other' (Campbell 1999).
It is not the result of choice or reason but comes as a surprise to both plaintiff and defendant. Manderson therefore rejects the fiction of forseeability, and the implicitly required foreknowledge of those affected by a tort, in favour of the element of negligence called "breach", a failure of the non-contractual duty of care potentially owed to the rest of the world. Here he is reflecting the Lévinasian definition of proximity as arising 'not from my choices or foresight, nor from our policies, but from your vulnerability' (Manderson 2006, 176) . Through this insight, Mr Sutradhar is in proximity to the NERC through his asymmetric relationship with them and a capacity to be harmed that he could not avoid.
Manderson goes on to argue that we must focus on the relationship between the parties and 'the power and the passivity of their dynamic'. He suggests that the question of proximity 'will only be resolved by a greater concentration on the actual and lived connection between the two, and not by a greater abstraction ' (2006, 172) .
Legal geographies present an opportunity here at scales ranging from the local to the 
Conclusion
If the House of Lords sends this case to trial, it may yet turn out to be a landmark. The NERC was sued in the negligence element of the law relevant to environmental torts.
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While some academics and members of the public may have sympathy with Davies and Exley for being put in the firing line, when they no doubt thought that their 1992 report was just another scientific report that would have a narrow audience and one that would make a small but positive contribution to the development of Bangladesh, there are others who argue that the full weight of responsibility should be borne by those of us who write such reports or undertake consultancy work in the developing world.
Certainly, the concept of proximity has, in our view, scope for revision in the light of the ethical writings of Lévinas and poststructural gift theory, and, as a result, legal geographies may in future be propelled into the limelight of debates about torts of global significance. 14 There is presently a campaign by the Bangladesh Arsenic Mitigation Water Supply
Project and a host of NGOs to provide alternatives to tubewells. These include improved versions of the traditional dug wells, sand filters to enable the use of pond water, and the harvesting of rainwater. Unfortunately there is evidence of arsenic in dug well water in some districts, and well and pond water has low bacteriological quality, so these alternatives are not guaranteed to be risk-free. 
